VoIP Security: How Secure is Your IP Phone?

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Security concerns in telephony are not new...



Image courtesy of the Computer History Museum



Nor are our attempts to protect against threats...



Models for Hand-set Phone

A Telephone Silencer - the HUSH-A-PHONE

A solution of three phone problems of subscribers

Safeguarding Privacy: So others cannot hear confidential matters

Eliminating Phone Talk Annoyance: Quieting the office for personnel efficiency

Improving Hearing in Noisy Places: By keeping surrounding noises out of the transmitter

Write for Booklet T-E.

Hush-A-Phone Corporation, 43 W. 16th St., N. Y. City



Models for Pedestal Phone

Image courtesy of Mike Sandman - http://www.sandman.com/

First objective is to employ best practices and plug the obvious holes...



A Few Security Terms

- → Denial of Service (DoS)
 - Repetitive attacks that limit normal access to services
- → Virus
 - Attached to a program and propagates when that program is executed
- → Worm
 - Move through a network quickly from device to device, both intranet and Internet
- → Trojan horse
 - Viruses and worms hide in other programs hence the name
- → Spoofing
 - Changing your MAC or IP address to impersonate another device
- → Spam for Internet Telephony (SPIT)
 - Telemarketing in the age of VolP
- → Phishing



BARNEY catigroup)	
Details Confirmation	
Please Confirm Your User Information	tion
ATM Debit Card:	Forgot your User Name or Password?
Expiration Date:	 Enroll Now to take full advantage of Smith Barne Access.
User Name: Password:	► Guests please Register.
E-mail Address:	 Privacy and Security Your personal information is secure and confidential.





The Implications are Clear

- → Ensure privacy and appropriate access to information
- → Maximize service availability
- → Cost avoidance
- → Confidence to extend services to broadest group of users:
 - Local, remote, mobile
- → Legal ramifications in some regions
- → Security is strategic



The Noise is Deafening

- → "VoIP Security" makes the headlines in countless articles
- → Everyone is issuing security advisories
 - Manufacturers of software and hardware
 - Security research firms
 - Vendors of security products / training / services
 - Government (or quasi-government) entities
 - Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT)
 - CERT Coordination Center http://www.cert.org/
 - U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team http://www.us-cert.gov/
 - U.K.'s National Infrastructure Security Coordination Center (NISCC) http://www.niscc.gov.uk
 - AUS-CERT http://www.auscert.org.au/
- → Each day brings more to your inbox and news




The Problem is Complex

→ Multiple vendors and applications

→ Competing vendor and internal priorities

→ Responsibilities spread among internal groups





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What is the Industry Doing to Help?

- → VoIP Security Alliance http://www.voipsa.org/
- → "VOIPSA's mission is to promote the current state of VoIP security research, VoIP security education and awareness, and free VoIP testing methodologies and tools."



- Mitel, Avaya, Nortel, Siemens, Alcatel, Extreme Networks, etc.
- Now over 100 members on the Technical Board of Advisors
- → Projects: Threat Taxonomy, Security Requirements, Security Research, Best Practices, Testing
- → Public "VOIPSEC" mailing list for discussion of VoIP security issues
 - http://www.voipsa.org/VOIPSEC/ (and yes, it's all CAPS)
- → "VoIP Security Threat Taxonomy" released in late 2005
- → Next project industry-wide "Best Practices"
- → So what are the actual threats to IP Telephony?





Understanding IP Telephony Security Threats



Confidentiality Integrity Availability



Security Threats ... Confidentiality

Confidentiality Integrity Availability

→Voice

- Threat Eavesdropping, man-in-the-middle attacks
- Consequences confidentiality breach between called and calling parties which can be used for personal or company gain

→ Call Control

- Threat exposure of information about users, systems, patterns
- Consequences privacy breach and / or malicious usage

→ Defense Strategies

- Physical protection (wiring closets, equipment rooms)
- Use of Ethernet switching instead of shared media
- Use VLANs, VPNs where applicable (just like your data network!)
- Encrypt conversations and call control, secure the media stream SRTP
- Ensure routing tables, instructions, account codes are well maintained and password protected



Security Threats ... Integrity

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability

- → Ensure that packets get from one point to another without modification
- → Voice
 - Threat impersonation of user, injection of other audio
 - Consequences ranging from unlimited to annoyance

→ Call Control

- Threat fraudulent use of telephony resources toll fraud, impersonation
- Consequences increased costs and / or malicious usage

→ Passwords

- Threat discovery of a user, system or application password
- Consequences unlimited, depending on the role and function of the discovered password

→ Defense Strategies:

- Use encryption for secure communications
- Change default password, minimum length, enforce periodic change
- Never exchange passwords in clear text
- Password maintenance, delete ex-employees, security codes



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Security Threats ... Availability

Confidentiality Integrity Availability


- → Ensure that communication services are available to users
- →Avoid any adverse effects resulting from a denial of service (DoS) attack or computer worm
- → Denial of Service:
 - Threat Teardrop, SMURF or Ping of Death
 - Consequences partial or total loss of telephony or related services

→ Defense Strategies:

- Rigorous virus updates and OS patches
- Intrusion detection systems
- Protect access from external sources (firewall)
- Limit access from internal sources (firewall)
- Use of 802.1 p/q (VLAN) to isolate and protect voice domain bandwidth from data domain Denial of Service (DoS) floods



Security Aspects of IP Telephony







The Media Path


→Threats:

- Eavesdropping particularly if over wireless or open Internet (sniffing)
- Degraded voice quality through Denial of Service (DoS) attack

→ Defense Strategies:

- Encryption of voice path
- WPA, WPA2 for wireless
- VLANs
- Packet filtering







The Signalling Path

Call


→Threats:

- Denial of Service
- Impersonation
- Snooping account codes
- Toll fraud

→ Defense Strategies:

- Signalling path encryption
- Encrypted set firmware loads
- Proper system programming







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The Management Path

→Threats:


- Snooping passwords
- Denial of service
- Application Impersonation
- Monitoring call patterns
- Malicious system modifications

→ Defense Strategies:

- DoS defenses in network infrastructure
- Changing default passwords
- Ensure physical security
- Authentication secure port access
- Secure Socket Layer (SSL)










PSTN and Legacy Devices

→Threats:

- Toll fraud via public network attack
- Impersonation
- Feature access

→ Defense Strategies:

- Class of Restriction (COR)
- Class of Service (COS)
- Account Codes
- Trunk Restrictions
- Interconnect Restrictions





What about SPIT? ("SPam over Internet Telephony")



- Makes for great headlines, but not a real threat today
- → Fear is script/tool that:
 - 1. Iterates through calling SIP addresses:

111@sip.company.com, 112@sip.company.com, 113@sip.company.com, etc.

2. Opens an audio stream if call is answered (by person or voicemail)

Reality is that today such direct connections are generally not allowed

- → This will change as companies make greater use of SIP trunking and/or directly connect IP-PBX systems to the Internet (and allow incoming calls from any other IP endpoint)
- → Until that time, PSTN provides a de facto firewall
 - Telemarketers have to initiate unsolicited calls through the PSTN
- → Note that VoIP just might give you more control...





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IEEE 802.1X



- → How do you know who is plugging into your network jacks?
- → Network device must be authenticated before switch port is opened
- → IEEE 802.1X Authentication for Desktops
 - Support for Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
 - EAP-MD5
 - Protected EAP (PEAP)
 - EAP-TTLS (Tunneled TLS)
 - EAP-TLS
 - EAP-FAST
 - Lightweight EAP (LEAP)
 - Support for authentication via EAP to a RADIUS (or other similar) server
 - Username and password entered through the phone interface or included certificate



Best Practices for VoIP Security

Best Practices for VolP Security

→ General Network

- All voice streams and call signalling should be encrypted, ideally end-to-end.
 - Voice should be encrypted with Secure RTP (SRTP) using 128-bit AES. Signalling should use SSL/TLS wherever possible. (Alternative solutions use IPSec to encrypt everything.)
- Networks should be evaluated for readiness to carry VolP traffic.
- Virtual LANs (VLANs) should be used to segment voice and data network.
- Secure mechanisms should be used for traversal of firewalls.

→ Management

- Remote management should only be performed over encrypted connections.
- Proper password management techniques should be used.
 - Any default passwords must be changed. Passwords need rotation.
- System actions should be logged with appropriate audit capabilities.
- Only secure connections should be used for web access, i.e. SSL/HTTPS.

→ Endpoint/Sets

- Set software loads should be encrypted and tamper-proof.
- Sets should run the minimum of services required.
- Connection of a set to the system must require an initial authentication and authorization.



Best Practices for VolP Security, continued

→ Servers / ICPs

- Servers should be incorporated into appropriate patch management and anti-virus systems.
- All telephony equipment and servers should be located in an environment providing appropriate physical security.
- Sufficient backup power should be available to maintain operation of telephony devices (and necessary network infrastructure) in the event of a power failure.


→Wireless

All wireless devices should implement WPA and/or WPA2 versus WEP.

→ PSTN Threats

- Appropriate measures such as Class of Restriction should be in place to prevent toll fraud.
- Where there is high concern, accounts codes should be enabled to allow better tracking.
- SMDR records should be enabled and utilized to monitor call usage.








VoIP Standards

- → Most VoIP deployments today are still with proprietary protocols
- → However, industry future focused around:
 - SIP Session Initiation Protocol
 - SRTP Secure RTP
- → Most VoIP Standards are under the IETF:
 - Working Groups: SIP, SIPPING, SIMPLE, MMUSIC, BEHAVE, ECRIT, SPEER
- → Some of the major VoIP security issues before the IETF:
 - How do you securely exchange the keys to enable SRTP between vendors?
 - How do you know the identity of the caller? (i.e. to combat SPIT)
 - How do you address emergency calling? (i.e. E-911)
 - How do you find another number over the Internet without using the PSTN? (ENUM)
 - How do we improve NAT/firewall traversal?
 - How do connections between "peers" authenticate? (i.e. SIP trunking for PSTN bypass)
- → New Real-time Applications and Infrastructure (RAI) "area" within IETF to add focus
- → Additional standards in IEEE (802.1x, 802.11), ECMA (CSTA), ISO and TIA (LLDP-MED).





Security Aspects of IP Telephony





Security Links

- → VoIP Security Alliance http://www.voipsa.org
 - Threat Taxonomy http://www.voipsa.org/Activities/taxonomy.php
 - VOIPSEC mailing list http://www.voipsa.org/VOIPSEC/
- → Blue Box: The VoIP Security Podcast http://www.blueboxpodcast.com/
- → Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) http://www.cert.org/
- →U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team http://www.us-cert.gov/
- →U.K.'s National Infrastructure Security Coordination Center (NISCC) http://www.niscc.gov.uk
- → AUS-CERT http://www.auscert.org.au/
- →Internet Storm Center http://isc.sans.org/




The Paradox of VoIP: One could argue that VoIP is already far more secure than the PSTN ever was





And Remember....



.13 foot ladders

It's a question of vigilance



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slide 32

Thank you



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Report security issues to <u>security@mitel.com</u>

